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Abstract
Language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a
complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which
the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however
the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elab-
orateness of the message. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender
learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes
the message and provides a best guess about the state. The incentives of the players are
aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increas-
ing in the accuracy of the receivers guess. As would be expected, we nd that larger
communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both sender and receiver.
Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very di¤erent setting, we nd that
there is overcommunication. For the receiver, there is a positive relationship between the
payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship
is negative for the senders. We also nd that the response time of both the sender and
receiver are positively related to their payo¤s.
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1 Introduction
Words exhibit properties very di¤erent from those of real numbers. For instance, it is not the
case that there exists a word with a meaning between any two words. However, words are
used to construct statements which convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
One can use words to express more and more detailed and nuanced information, but only at
a cost to the sender. So it is our view that language is an imperfect and uneven means of
communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental
investigation of a setting in which the language available to the sender imperfectly describes the
state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the
complexity or elaborateness of the message. Although we nd that senders overcommunicate,
we also nd that senders conserve expensive signals and that receivers anticipate this e¤ect.
Hertel and Smith (2010) provides a theoretical account of communication where an in-
formed party faces a restricted message space and can send a more elaborate message by
incurring a larger cost of communication. Specically, the sender has a set of message ele-
ments with which to compose a message. The sender can send a more elaborate message,
by composing a message containing more message elements, where the cost is increasing in
the number of elements. This would seem to be a natural way to model costly and discrete
communication.1 Hertel and Smith characterize the equilibria, of which there are many.
The authors introduce an out-of-equilibrium condition, whereby under this condition only the
most informative class of equilibria remains. The paper makes the prediction that more costly
signals will be conserved (sent on smaller regions of the state space) and that communication
outcomes for both sender and receiver are decreasing in communication costs incurred by the
sender. The present paper can be viewed as an experimental test of the setup and predictions
of Hertel and Smith (2010).
In this experiment, the subjects are anonymously divided into pairs, one as a sender and
one as a receiver. As is standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state
1See Hertel and Smith (2010) for further discussion of the modeling choices.
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of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The receiver observes the message and
selects an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. The incentives of the players are
aligned in the sense that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in
the accuracy of the receivers action.
We make two notable departures from the literature. First, the set of messages imperfectly
relate to the underlying state space. Second, in order to transmit a more elaborate message,
a larger communication cost is incurred by the sender. Here the state space is an integer
between  3 and 3. The sender can send a costless message, which we refer to as the empty
message.2 Additionally, the sender can compose a costly message consisting of two possible
elements "High" and "Low." Given our state space, these message elements would seem to
provide a natural ordering. The cost of a message is then a function of the number of elements
in the message. Therefore, the empty message can be transmitted at a cost of 0; the messages
"High" and "Low" can be transmitted at a cost of c; and the messages "High High," "High
Low," "Low High" and "Low Low" can be transmitted at a cost of 2c, where we vary c.
We nd that the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly, because the senders are over-
communicating. We nd that there is a negative relationship between the senders payo¤s
relative to the equilibrium payo¤s and the communication costs. However, we nd a positive
relationship between the receivers payo¤s relative to the equilibrium payo¤s and the commu-
nication costs. We also nd that the response time is positively related to the payo¤s relative
to the equilibrium payo¤s, for both sender and receiver.
2 Related Literature
There is a literature which tests existing communication models in general and the Crawford
and Sobel (1982) model in particular. Perhaps the rst paper testing Crawford and Sobel
was Dickhaut et. al. (1995) whereas more recent examples include Cai and Wang (2006), and
2Throughout the paper we describe the costless message as empty rather than the condition of having not
received a message. This is because, it might not be easy to distinguish between the sender having decided not
to send a message and the sender having not yet sent a message. To rule out this confusion we describe the
costless message as empty.
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Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Due to the limited ability of subjects to nd complex equilibria
in novel situations, testing communication equilibria typically uses simplied versions of the
model. A natural way to accomplish this simplication is to specify the state space as a set
of integers rather than the unit interval. For instance, Dickhaut et. al. species the state
space as the integers between 1 and 4 and Cai and Wang species the state space as an integer
between 1 and 9. We select a state space as the set of integers between  3 and 3 in order
to render the signal elements of "High" and "Low" relatively meaningful. Further, we hoped
that the empty message would be used to denote the set around the state 0. This would
seem to aid in the coordination problem3 between the sender and receiver. Also note that in
Dickhaut et. al. (1995), Cai and Wang (2006), and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) there is
a one-to-one relationship between the state and the set of feasible signals. By contrast, for
su¢ ciently high communication costs (c), in out paper there is no such protable relationship.
Studies of cheap talk communication have found that the senders often overcommunicate.4
Relatedly there is a literature which nds that subjects can have an aversion to lying.5 Again,
this literature nds that senders overcommunicate. Note that our subjects never have an
incentive to mislead the sender because the sender and receiver have identical preferences over
the action of the receiver. Despite the fact that our experimental environment is quite di¤erent
from the setting in these two literatures, we also nd that the senders overcommunicate. Given
that we observe similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, we argue that overcommunication
is a robust phenomenon.
Economists have recently become interested in studying the response times of subjects.6
Research has found that longer response times are associated with more strategic and less
automatic reasoning. Consistent with this research, we nd that longer response times are
associated with higher per period payo¤s relative to equilibrium payo¤s, for both sender and
receiver.
3Prior work nds that subjects can resolve similar coordination problems (Blume et. al., 1998, 2001; Blume
and Gneezy, 2000; Kreps, 1990). However this is not the focus of our paper.
4For example, see Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009).
5For instance, Gneezy (2005), Hurkens and Kartik (2009), and Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2007, 2009).
6For instance, Brañas-Garza and Miller (2008), Piovesan and Wengström (2009), and Rubinstein (2007)
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3 Equilibrim Predictions
We now present a discussion of the equilibria as predicted by Hertel and Smith (2010), which
admits only the most informative equilibria. Recall that our state space is s 2 f 3;  2;  1;
0; 1; 2; 3g. Our message space is m 2 ? [ ([2i=1fHigh; Lowgi). The communication costs
c(m) are a function of the number of elements transmitted. The receiver has an action space
of a 2 f 3; 2:5;  2;  1:5;  1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; 2; 2:5; 3g. Both the sender and receiver
prefer the receiver to select the action as close to the state as possible. Specically, in each
period, the payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to:
UR = 100  25(a  s)2. (1)
In each period, the payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to:
US = UR   c(m). (2)
For c 2 [0; 12:5], any fully revealing equilibria will exist. Specically, each message is used
and a single message is sent for each state. For c 2 [0; 25] then all fully revealing equilibria
will exist, with the exception that adjacent states do not have a di¤erence in communication
cost of 2c. In each of these fully revealing equilibria, the ex-ante payo¤s are identical: the
expected payo¤ for the receiver in each equilibria is EUR = 100 and the expected payo¤ for
the sender in each equilibria is EUS = EUR   107 c.
For c 2 [25; 94], the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not used.
Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on 2 adjacent states and the empty message is sent
on 3 adjacent states. The expected payo¤ of the receiver is EUR = 1007 + 2  757 + 4  947 . The
expected payo¤ for the sender is EUS = EUR   47c. It should be noted that the equilibrium
predictions are identical within each of the intervals mentioned. Therefore, the predictions
for equilibrium behavior are the same whether c = 26 or 93.
For c 2 [94; 100] then the equilibria is such that the messages with two elements are not
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used. Messages "High" and "Low" are each sent on the extreme states, 3 and  3. The
empty message is sent on the remaining states. Given the empty message, the receiver is
indi¤erent between selecting  0:5 and 0:5. The expected payo¤ to the receiver is EUR =
2  947 + 2  447 + 2  1007 . The expected payo¤ to the sender is EUS = EUR   27c. Note that
the receiver is indi¤erent between selecting  0:5 and 0:5 but not 0. If the sender is pooling
on more than 3 states, the expected payo¤ of selecting  0:5 or 0:5 is 2  947 + 2  447 = 2867 and
the expected payo¤ of selecting 0 is 1007 + 2  757 = 2507 . Therefore, selecting an integer action
yields a lower payo¤.
For c > 100 then the only equilibria is one in which the sender only sends the empty
message for all states and the receiver has no additional information about the state and is
therefore indi¤erent among selecting  1:5; 0:5; 0:5 and 1:5. The expected payo¤s are then
EUR = EUS = 2  947 + 2  447 .
4 Experimental Design
A total of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were both undergraduate
and graduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted from 90 to 120
minutes.
In each period, the sender was shown the state, which we referred to as the "secret number."
The state s consisted of an integer between  3 and 3. In order to inform the receiver of its
content, the sender was able to transmit a possibly costly message. The message "Empty
message" cost c(m) = 0, the messages "High" and "Low" each cost c(m) = c, the messages
"High High," "High Low," "Low High," and "Low Low," each cost c(m) = 2c, where c 2 f10;
30; 50; 96g. Upon observing the message, the receiver selected a best guess about the state.
The receivers action a was selected from the action space of half integers between  3 and 3.
The per period payo¤ to the receiver was the nonnegative integer closest to 100 25(a s)2.
The per period payo¤ to the sender was the integer closest to the receivers payo¤s minus c(m).
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In order to aid in the estimation of their payo¤s, the subjects were given a table indicating
the payo¤s associated with each state and action selected by the receiver.7 The subjects were
given a $5 show up fee and $1 for every 300 points accumulated.8
Sender and receiver were matched and played the game for 15 periods where c was held
xed. After the 15 periods, each subject was rematched with a di¤erent opponent, each
switched role as sender and receiver, and played with a new value of c. Each trial consisted of
4 rounds of 15 periods. The subjects were made aware of these matching procedures. We ran
two treatments which consisted of 8 subjects and two treatments of 16 subjects. Therefore,
we have a total of 1440 data points for both sender and receiver.
A few comments on our methodology are in order. Since we expected overcommunication,
even though only the senders incurred the communication costs, we designed the experiment
to reduce the social preferences of the sender towards the receiver. First, we emphasized
the di¤erences in the payo¤s by displaying the per period payo¤ of both subjects. Second,
we emphasized the anonymous matching whereby after each round of 15 periods, the players
would be rematched with a new partner. This was done in order to discourage any implicit
reciprocal play. Finally, many experimental communication papers rematch the subjects
after each period. However, we decided not to rematch, as there is a reasonably di¢ cult
coordination problem, which would be aggravated by rematching after every period.
5 Results
In each of the four rounds, the subjects exhibited learning across periods 1-15. Across all
periods, the relationship between the senders payo¤s and the period in which it was obtained
is very signicant (p = 0:01). However, within periods 5-15, the relationship is not signicant
(p = 0:7). Therefore, within each round, we exclude from consideration the data obtained in
periods 1-4.
7See the appendix for this table.
8The total amount earned in the experiment ranged from $6:29 to $20:54, with an average of $15:62.
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Overall, the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly. Within each communication cost
treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence between the senders payo¤s and the equilibrium
prediction. In all but the highest cost treatment, there is a signicant di¤erence between the
receivers payo¤s and the equilibrium prediction. This data is presented in Table 1.
Sender Receiver
Equilibrium Actual Equilibrium Actual
c = 10 85:71 67:13 100:00 81:03
c = 30 72:29 47:16 89:43 84:09
c = 50 60:86 29:60 89:43 76:00
c = 96 40:57  6:14 68:00 69:86
Table 1: Equilibrium predictions of payo¤s and actual mean payo¤s for senders
and receivers according communication costs. Results of one-sample t-tests each
with 263 degrees of freedom, where ** indicates signicance of a one-sided test at
p < 0:01.
Recall that the receivers payo¤s correspond to the accuracy of the receivers action and the
senders payo¤s correspond to this accuracy minus communication costs. A glance at Table
1 suggests that as communication costs increase, the actions are becoming more accurate
yet the senders are doing worse relative to the equilibrium predictions. This suggests that
the senders are overcommunicating. In particular, the senders payo¤s vary too much with
communication costs and the receivers payo¤s do not vary enough. This is conrmed by
the following regressions with the dependent variable of actual payo¤s minus equilibrium
payo¤s. In regressions (S1)   (S5) of Table 2, the dependent variable is the senders actual
payo¤s minus the senders equilibrium payo¤s and in regressions (R1)  (R5) of Table 3, the
dependent variable is the receivers actual payo¤s minus the receivers equilibrium payo¤s.
The independent variables included the communication costs faced by the sender, the time in
which it took the subject to select their decision. Regressions (S1)   (S4) and (R1)   (R4)
do not account for possible xed e¤ects in our panel data, however regressions (S5) and (R5)
perform a subject specic xed e¤ect regression.
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(S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5)
Intercept  15:23  87:15  71:55  61:55  56:30
(2:81) (6:83) (7:15) (12:44) (9:16)
Communication Costs  0:33    0:31  0:50  0:31
(0:050) (0:049) (0:20) (0:08)
Response Time   2:46 2:40 1:97 2:04
(0:29) (0:28) (0:52) (0:29)
Interaction       0:0083  
(0:0085)
Fixed E¤ects No No No No Y es
n 1056 1043 1043 1043 1043
R2 0:039 0:066 0:10 0:10 0:27
Table 2: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the senders
actual payo¤s minus senders equilibrium payo¤s, and ** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:05.
(R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5)
Intercept  18:41  36:51  48:03  39:95  56:30
(1:88) (4:63) (4:88) (8:12) (9:16)
Communication Costs 0:20   0:21 0:049 0:42
(0:033) (0:033) (0:13) (0:054)
Response Time   1:23 1:30 0:94 1:07
(0:20) (0:20) (0:35) (0:20)
Interaction       0:0073  
(0:0058)
Fixed E¤ects No No No No Y es
n 1056 1041 1041 1041 1041
R2 0:034 0:035 0:072 0:074 0:23
Table 3: Results of regressions where the dependent variable is the receivers
actual payo¤s minus receivers equilibrium payo¤s and ** indicates signicance at
p < 0:01.
The number of observations is not constant in either table because, for regressions involving
response time, we only included observations with response times greater than 0.9 First,
note that in Table 2, every specication involving communication costs has a negative and
signicant estimate. This suggests that as communication costs increase, the senders do worse
relative to the equilibrium predictions. We note the opposite e¤ect the receivers. Table 3
shows that in (R1), (R3), and (R5), the estimates for the coe¢ cient for communication costs
9The z-Tree output included negative response times.
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are positive and signicant. In (R4) the coe¢ cient is estimated to be positive but it is not
signicant. Therefore, as the communication costs increase, the receivers do better relative
to the equilibrium predictions.
Also note the results of Tables 2 and 3 involving the time it took the subject to make the
choice. In all 8 specications involving response time, the estimate is signicant and positive.
Consistent with the literature, we nd a relationship between response time and performance.
We account for the subject specic xed e¤ects in (S5) and (R5), where we nd that the
response time variable remains signicant. These results rule out the claim that the previous
response time results are driven by the heterogeneity of the subjects. Also note that for each
specication, the estimates for the sender are larger than that for the receiver. This suggests
that the senders problem is more di¢ cult than the receivers. Therefore, additional time
considering choice as a sender is more productive than that as a receiver.
Although the equilibrium predictions do rather poorly, the subjects do exhibit some degree
of sophistication. Perhaps, this is best appreciated by the inference of the empty signal by
the receiver as a function of the communication costs. We perform a binomial probit with the
communication costs as an independent variable and the probability that the empty message
leads to an action of 0 as the dependent variable. The results of this probit are listed in Table
4.
Intercept 1:997
(0:234)
Communication costs  0:0205
(0:0030)
 LL 131:27
2 45:28
n 274
Table 4: Binomial probit of subjects selecting the action 0 upon observing the
empty message, where ** indicates signicance at p < 0:01
The results of the probit analysis suggest that there is a negative relationship between the
probability that the receiver plays the action 0 after observing the empty message and the
communication costs faced by the sender. Recall, our discussion of the equilibrium predictions.
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In equilibrium for low communication costs, the sender sends the empty message on a single
state, the focal state being 0. In equilibrium for intermediate costs, the sender sends the
empty message for 3 states, the focal states being  1, 0, and 1. In equilibrium, for large
costs, the sender sends the empty message, e¤ectively for all states. While the senders do not
behave exactly as in equilibrium, in our experiment there is a relationship between the number
of states on which the empty message is sent and communication costs. Further, the receivers
are inferring that qualitative behavior and therefore there is a negative relationship between
selecting the action 0 after observing the empty message and the communication costs faced
by the sender.
6 Conclusions
We run an experiment where the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the
state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing
the complexity or elaborateness of the message. The incentives of the players are aligned
in that both sender and receiver are paid an amount which is increasing in the accuracy of
the receivers action. Although the equilibrium predictions of Hertel and Smith (2010) do
rather poorly, our experimental results do corroborate some of the qualitative predictions.
In particular we nd that the payo¤s of both sender and receiver are negatively related to
the communication costs incurred by the sender. We also nd that, expensive signals are
conserved when communication is expensive and that and that receivers infer this relationship.
Consistent with the communication literature, albeit in very di¤erent setting, we nd that
there is overcommunication. For the receivers, there is a positive relationship between the
payo¤s relative to the equilibrium predictions and communication costs. This relationship is
negative for the senders. We also nd that the response time of both the sender and receiver
are positively related to payo¤s, implying that more thought on the part of our subjects leads
to better communication outcomes.
We view the results of this paper to be a conrmation of the robustness of the overcommu-
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nication found in previous communication experiments which were conducted in very di¤erent
settings. In these cheap talk experiments, the sender and receiver have di¤erent preferences
over the action of the receiver. Therefore, overcommunication in these experiments takes the
form that the senders do not do not conceal the truth enough. Unlike the overcommunication
found these settings, the senders in our experiment say too much. Given that we observe
similar behavior in such di¤erent settings, it would seem that overcommunication is a robust
phenomenon.
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8 Appendix
Although the payo¤s were specied by equations (1) and (2), the subjects were also presented
with the following table.
Action
-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
-3 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-2 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-1 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0 0 0
State 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 74 44 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100 94 75
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 75 94 100
Senders Screen
15
Receivers Screen
16
8.1 Outcomes
Messages sent by the senders given the state observed and communication costs
c = 10 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 1 1 1 31 3 2 0
 2 1 1 21 4 19 1 0
States  1 0 0 16 0 14 3 0
0 34 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 4 14 0 7 18 0
2 1 19 0 1 2 9 3
3 0 9 0 0 0 0 22
c = 30 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 0 1 5 26 0 1 0
 2 0 0 27 5 5 3 0
States  1 6 1 10 0 11 2 0
0 27 4 1 0 2 2 0
1 16 7 4 0 6 10 1
2 2 29 0 0 1 11 0
3 0 12 0 0 0 0 26
c = 50 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 2 0 23 14 0 0 2
 2 1 1 32 0 3 0 0
States  1 16 0 16 1 7 0 0
0 36 0 2 1 0 0 0
1 18 4 8 1 1 4 0
2 3 29 0 0 2 9 0
3 0 15 1 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Messages
Empty High Low Low Low Low High High Low High High
 3 4 2 20 18 1 1 0
 2 8 0 12 1 2 2 0
States  1 20 0 13 2 5 0 0
0 35 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 25 4 3 0 0 5 0
2 13 27 0 1 0 1 0
3 5 18 0 0 0 0 16
17
Action selected by the receivers given the message and communication costs
c = 10 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 1 0 0 0 0 0
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 22 7 2
Low 3 2 19 11 6 3 1 1 6 1 0 0 0
Messages Low Low 30 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Low High 3 3 14 4 10 1 1 0 6 3 0 1 0
High Low 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 15 7 6 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 21
c = 30 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 0 0 0 0 2 49 0 0 0 0 0 0
High 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 8 22 17 3
Low 2 6 20 9 6 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0
Messages Low Low 28 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Low High 0 0 4 1 11 1 1 0 5 0 2 0 0
High Low 0 0 4 1 2 0 2 0 9 4 7 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 26
c = 50 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 0 1 2 0 1 2 59 5 4 1 1 0 0
High 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 15 15 8
Low 6 12 16 18 20 2 2 0 3 3 0 0 0
Messages Low Low 14 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Low High 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0
High Low 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 7 1 0
High High 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
c = 96 Action
 3  2:5  2  1:5  1  0:5 0 0:5 1 1:5 2 2:5 3
Empty 3 4 1 7 4 4 58 8 8 6 4 1 2
High 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 17 9 16
Low 11 6 12 3 8 1 0 0 5 0 0 2 0
Messages Low Low 18 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Low High 0 0 1 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
High Low 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 0
High High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
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